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Abstract 
We examine the effects of parental emigration from Sri Lanka 
on the education of the migrants’ children left behind. Using 
access to foreign-employment agencies at community level as an 
instrument for migration in two-stage least squares estimations, 
we do not find parental migration matters on average. However, 
analyses by the gender of the migrants show the effects are 
heterogeneous: When the mothers migrate and the fathers stay 
behind, education of the children worsens; but, when the fathers 
migrate and the mothers take care of the children, it improves. 
There are also some evidence boys, younger children, and 
children of the less educated parents gain more from parental 
migration. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Many people in developing countries like Mexico, India, and Sri Lanka emigrate to 
work and remit their incomes back home. In 2013, 232 million people or 3.2% of the 
world’s population are international migrants; about 40% of these are from less 
developed countries (United Nations, 2013). Developing countries in 2013 may receive 
US$414 billion remittances—some of these countries get more remittances than foreign 
aids or foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2013).  Sri Lanka, for example, a 
country of twenty million people, has 1.3 million emigrants, 6% of the population; they 
remit US$6 billion in 2012, about 9% of the Sri Lankan GDP and more than one-third 
of its foreign exchange (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2012; Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign 
Employment, 2011). 
 
These large flows of migration and remittances raise the question of what happens to 
the migrants’ children left behind—a legitimate concern given that many of the 
migrants are poor. Does migration, through remittances,  relax the financial constraints 
of the migrants’ families and, therefore, improve their children’s welfare? Or, does 
migration worsen it, because the absence of parents at home harms the children 
psychologically or disrupts their lives (the children may have to spend more time to do 
household chores, take care of their younger siblings, or work for money)?1 Or, do 
remittances perhaps just offset the adverse effects of the parental absence? 
 
                                                          
1
 Ginther and Polllak (2004) and Sandefur and Wells (1997), for example, find parental absence 
from homes adversely affects children in developed countries. 
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In this paper, we examine the effects of parental migration on one aspect of children’s 
welfare in Sri Lanka, their education.2 Looking at the case of Sri Lanka is interesting 
because most Sri Lankan emigrants are poor and low-skilled whose children are likely 
to be affected by parental migration. Moreover, more women emigrate to work from Sri 
Lanka than men do unlike, for example, its neighbouring countries (Nana, 2002), which 
allows us to identify the effects of migration by the gender of the migrants, in particular 
the effects of maternal migration on the education of the migrants’ children. There have 
been also policy debates in Sri Lanka recently on whether the government of Sri Lanka 
should restrict female migration because of its possible adverse effects on the families 
left behind in addition to the cases of abuse that some Sri Lankan women face when 
they work in the Middle East (The Sunday Times, 2013; Daily Mirror, 2013).  
 
The empirical literature is mixed on whether parental migration improves the education 
of the migrants’ children: The findings vary by treatment variable, sample of children, 
and empirical strategy. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010), using instrumental variable  
(IV) techniques, find remittances increase school attendance in Haiti, but they also 
highlight the adverse effects, migration may have on the children left behind. Cox-
Edwards and Ureta (2003), using the Cox proportional hazard model—and Mansuri 
(2006), Yang (2008), and Hanson and Woodruff (2003),using IV techniques—find 
migration or remittances increase enrolment rates or years of schooling in El Salvador, 
                                                          
2
 We focus on the overall effects of parental migration on the education of the migrants’ 
children, not only those of remittances. In the case of split migration, the type of migration we 
analyse in this paper, the receipt of remittances also means the absence of mothers or fathers, 
which may also affect the children’s education. 
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Pakistan, Phillipines, and Mexico, respectively.3 In contrast, Antman (2011) and 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), also using IV techniques, find migration worsens 
children’s education in Mexico: Antman (2011) shows Mexican children spend less 
time to study and more time to work when their fathers migrate to the US; McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2011) show parental migration lowers the enrolment rates of the 
migrants’ children.4 
 
Because parental migration (in a regression of children’s education on whether their 
parents emigrate) is endogenous, the challenge of identification is to find exogenous 
variations in migration, which is why most papers in this line of literature use IV 
techniques to solve the endogeneity problems.5 In this paper, we use a new 
instrument—access to foreign-employment agencies at community level in Sri Lanka in 
the past. We show that the instrument strongly predicts current migration; moreover, 
there seems to be no differences between communities where the agencies operated and 
those where they did not. We, therefore, identify the effects of parental migration using 
a new source of exogenous variations, the effects of emigration of parents who are 
induced to migrate by having access to foreign-employment agencies. We also 
contribute to the literature by examining the effects of parental migration by the gender 
of the migrants, unlike many papers in the literature that examine the effects of parental 
                                                          
3Acosta (2011), however, does not find remittances help older Salvadoran boys. 
4
 See also Cattaneo (2012), Cuecuecha (2009), and Alcaraz et al. (2012). 
5
 Yang (2008), for example, uses exchange rates as an instrument for remittances. 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003), McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), Acosta (2011), and 
Mansuri (2006) use historical migration networks while Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010) 
and Antman (2011) use employment statistics in the host countries as an instrument for 
remittances or migration. 
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migration only. We provide some evidence that the effects of parental migration is 
heterogenous: Parental migration from Sri Lanka does not affect children’s education on 
average, but paternal migration improves the migrants’ children’s educational outcomes 
while maternal migration worsens them. By focusing on Sri Lanka where most migrants 
are low skilled workers and most of the female migrants work as housemaids in the 
Middle-East with minimal protection from abuse, we also add to the literature by 
examining how children from very poor households do in schools when their mothers or 
fathers emigrate to work. 
 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 3 
discusses the results and proposes mechanisms through which maternal migration and 
paternal migration affect children’s education differently. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2 DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
2.1 Data 
We use the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999-2000, a representative survey of Sri 
Lanka except for the Northern- and Eastern regions where the then ongoing civil war 
disrupted data collections. The survey includes 7,500 households and 35,181 
individuals. Because we want to study the effects of migration on children, we use the 
sample of schooling-age children between the ages of six and eighteen; we have 7,752 
children in the sample—3,893 boys and 3,859 girls.  
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We focus on the effects of emigration for work. There was also political migration from 
the Northern- and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka when the survey was done, but we 
exclude this form of migration because its effects on children’s education possibly 
differ. Besides, in the data, the sample of households that lived in the Northern- and 
Eastern regions of Sri Lanka is unrepresentative. 
 
We define the treatment variable, parental migration, the migratory status of parents, as 
an indicator equals one if the father or mother of a child emigrates abroad to work and 
zero otherwise. In some specifications, we also use two other treatment variables, 
maternal migration and paternal migration; they are indicators equal one if the mother 
and the father emigrates, respectively. 
 
We use four educational outcomes: school enrolment status of the children, their class-
age gap, whether they receive private tuition, and the households’ spending on 
education.6 All variables are child-level variables. We define them as follows: (1) The 
school enrolment status of a child is an indicator equals one if the child is currently in 
school and zero otherwise; (2) the class-age gap is the difference between the grade a 
child is attending and her age—a  measure of how well she does in school (because 
most children in Sri Lanka enter primary schools the year they are six years old, the 
class-age gap for most children is from -4 to -5 (Arunatilake, 2006); if they repeat 
grades, the class-age gap would decrease); (3) whether a child receives private tuition is 
an indicator equals one if the child receives private tuition and zero otherwise—a 
                                                          
6
 The survey has no information on other measures of outcomes such as students’ marks or 
whether the students repeat grades. 
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measure of access to private tutors (De Prabal and Ratha (2012), for example, use this 
variable as a measure of access to superior education); (4) spending on education is how 
much a household spends on a child’s education as a share of the household’s total 
spending. 
 
The summary statistics of the key variables in Table 1 shows no evidence that migrant- 
and non-migrant households differ statistically. Migrant households have more children, 
the mothers are more educated while the fathers are less educated, they are younger by 
about two years. Proportionately more Hindus, Muslims, and Christians migrate and 
less Buddhists do. The age, gender, and educational outcomes of the children are also 
similar across migrant- and non-migrant households. None of the differences across 
types of households statistically differ from zero.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
2.2 Empirical Strategy 
Because migration is endogenous, we estimate the effects of parental migration on the 
migrants' children’s education using instrumental variable (IV) techniques.7 In the first 
stage, we regress 
                                                          
7
 Migration is endogenous because: (1) There are unobserved factors that affect both migration 
and children’s education such as whether the parents are poor and uneducated or whether they 
want to live with their children as they grow up (omitted-variable bias problems); (2) children’s 
education and migration are likely to be jointly determined (for example, girls’ education and 
whether the mothers migrate may depend on women’s bargaining power within households); 
and (3) some parents may decide to migrate to finance their children’s education (reverse 
causality). 
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  =  + 	
 +  + ζ +  (1) 
where  is the migratory status of a parent, an indicator equals one if the father or 
the mother of child i in household j who lives in community k and district l is a migrant 
and zero otherwise; 
 is an instrumental variable that varies by community;  is a 
vector of child- and household characteristics; ζ

 is district fixed-effects, which control 
for observed- and unobserved time-invariant district-specific factors that affect both 
migration and children’s education such as how developed a district is in the past or 
how good schools in the district had been; and  is the error terms. In the second stage, 
we estimate 
  =  +  +  + ζ +  (2) 
where  is an educational outcome of child i and and  is the predicted migratory 
status of the child's father or mother from Equation (1). 
 
We use the local presence of foreign-employment agencies in 1995 (five years before 
the survey was done in 2000) as an instrument for migratory status. The instrument, 
agencies, is a community-level indicator equals one if a household lives in a community 
where foreign-employment agencies operated in 1995 and zero otherwise. We get the 
list of addresses of all registered foreign-employment agencies that operated in 1995 
from the Association of Licensed Foreign Employment Agents in Sri Lanka. We match 
these addresses with the communities in our sample and define agencies equals one if a 
community had foreign-employment agencies in 1995 and zero otherwise. 
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The instrument agencies predicts migratory status because foreign-employment 
agencies help prospective migrants in Sri Lanka to find job opportunities, prepare and 
submit their travel document and job applications on the migrants behalf, and mediate 
them with employers abroad. According to Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 
(2011), about 60% of male migrants and 75% of female migrants in Sri Lanka in the 
past fifteen years have used the services of the foreign-employment agencies. This 
instrument is, therefore, similar to migration network and migration costs that past 
studies such as Munshi (2003), Hanson and Woodruff (2003), and McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007) use to instrument for migration. Agencies, like migration network or 
migration costs, induces exogenous variations in the supply of migrants from source 
countries, which we can use to identify the effects of migration on migrants's children’s 
education.        
 
Table 2 presents the first-stage regression. Each cell provides an estimate of agencies in 
a regression of migratory status on agencies with (even-numbered columns) and without 
(odd-numbered columns) child- and household characteristics. In columns 1-2, the 
dependent variable is parental migration, an indicator equals one if a household head or 
his/her spouse migrates; in columns 3-4 maternal migration; in columns 5-6 paternal 
migration. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
The estimates show agencies predicts migratory status—the instrument is relevant. 
Living in a community where foreign-employment agencies operated in1995 increases 
the likelihood of parental, maternal, and paternal migration by 15, 17, and 14 percentage 
10 
 
points, respectively, which are large increases because only about 6% of households 
emigrate to work. The estimates are similar regardless of whether we control for child- 
and household characteristics. All estimates are statistically significant at 0.1% level; 
the adjusted R-squared are more than 20%; the F-statistics are larger than 18. 
 
We cannot test whether agencies correlates with children’s education only through 
migration (i.e., whether it satisfies the exclusionary restriction), but we do not find 
communities with- and those without foreign-employment agencies systematically 
differ in 1995, at least along the dimensions whose data are available. There is no 
evidence that foreign-employment agencies are more likely to operate in less developed 
communities (Panel A of Table 3 shows that both types of communities have had 
schools and health facilities since about 50 and 31 years ago, respectively) or that many 
household in Sri Lanka internally migrate and move to communities with foreign-
employment agencies to get employment abroad (only one in fifty households have 
migrated within Sri Lanka since 1995; the figures are the same in both communities 
with and without foregn-employment agencies). Communities with and without foreign-
employment agencies do not seem to systematically differ either as their characteristics 
in 2000 indicate (Panel B shows communities with foreign-employment agencies are 
more Iikely to have schools in 2000, but they are less likely to have health facilities, 
banks, or markets; more importantly, the differences do not differ statistically). Even the 
characteristics of the households (Panel C) and those of the children (Panel D) in 2000 
do not differ systematically and their differences do not differ statistically. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
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To summarise, the instrument is relevant: It predicts migratory status. It is also likely to 
meet the exclusionary restriction: There is no evidence that foreign-employment 
agencies operated in less-developed communities or in communities whose residents 
have high propensity to migrate; there is no evidence that households move to 
communities with foreign-employment agencies just because they want to migrate 
abroad either. Therefore, to the extent that the instrument satisfies the exclusionary 
restriction, the estimate of  in Equation (2) provides the causal effects of parental 
migration on the education of children whose parents are induced by foreign-
employment agencies to migrate abroad to work.  
 
 
3 RESULTS 
 
3.1 Basic Results 
Table 4 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) (columns 1-2) and the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) (columns 3-4) estimates of migration. Each cell provides an estimate of 
the effects of parental, maternal, and paternal migration on school enrolment status of 
the migrants' children, with (even-numbered columns) or without (odd-numbered 
columns) controlling for child- and household characteristics. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
We do not find evidence that parental migration matters: All estimates in row (1) of 
Table 4 are negative, but they are insignificant statistically. On average, parental 
migration does not seem to affect whether the migrants’ children attend schools. 
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Analyses by gender of the migrants in rows (2-3), however, show a different picture: 
Maternal migration lowers enrolment rates while paternal migration improves them. 
Both the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effects of maternal migration are negative 
regardless of whether we control for child- and household characteristics; all estimates 
of the effects of paternal migration are positive. The magnitude of the 2SLS estimates 
are larger than that of the OLS, which suggests OLS estimators have downward biases 
of the effects of migration. All estimates are significant statistically; the 2SLS estimates 
in particular are significant statistically at 0.01% level. The OLS estimates in row 2 and 
columns 1-2 indicate maternal migration is associated with 7-8 percentage points lower 
enrolment rates. The corresponding 2SLS estimates in columns 3-4 show maternal 
migration lowers enrolment rates by 17-19 percentage points, which equal a 20-23% 
decrease. In constrast, paternal migration, as row 3 columns 3-4 shows, increases 
enrolment rates by 13-15 percentage points, which equal a 15-18% increase. 
 
Table 5 presents the effects of migration on other educational outcomes. Each cell 
provides an OLS or 2SLS estimate of the effects of parental (Panel A), maternal (Panel 
B), and paternal (Panel C) migration on class-age gap, whether a child receive tuition, 
or budget share of education, with (even-numbered columns) or without (odd-numbered 
columns) controlling for child- and household characteristics. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Consistent with the results in Table 4, Panel A of Table 5 shows no evidence that 
parental migration affects the other educational outcomes. The relationship between 
13 
 
parental migration and education also vary by measure of outcome: While parental 
migration positively correlate with class-age gap and whether children receive tuition, it 
negatively correlates with enrolment status and household’s spending on education. The 
effects on whether children receive tuition and household’s spending on education are 
large economically, though, again, they are insignificant statistically. 
 
Panel B shows maternal migration lowers the probability of whether children receive 
private tuition. The 2SLS estimates in row 5 show maternal migration lowers the 
probability that a child receives tuition by 17-18 percentage points or 48-51%, which 
are significant statistically at 1% level. Maternal migration also correlates negatively 
with class-age gap and education spending, but they are insignificant statistically (rows 
4 and 6). The estimates of the latter are large economically, four percentage points or 
67%. 
 
Panel C, on the contrary, shows paternal migration improves class-age gap and whether 
children receive tuition. The 2SLS estimates in columns 3-4 suggest paternal migration 
increases class-age gaps and the probability of whether children receive tuition by 34-37 
and 49-51 percentage points, respectively, which are large economically (about 8% and 
140%, respectively) and significant statistically at 1% or 0.1% level. Paternal migration 
also seems to decrease education spending, though the estimates are insignificant 
statistically. 
 
These results indicate that the effects of parental migration are heterogenous. There 
seems to be no evidence of the effects of parental migration on children’s education, but 
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analyses by gender of the migrants show it does. If the mothers work abroad and the 
fathers stay behind with the children, the education of the children worsens; if the 
fathers work abroad and the mothers take care of the children, their education improves. 
 
3.2 Cohort Analyses 
Now we do cohort analyses whose results we present in Table 6. We examine the 
effects of maternal and paternal migration by gender of the children (Panel A), by age 
group of the children (Panel B), and by education of the parents (Panel C). We also add 
an interactive term between migratory status and the group dummy to allow the effects 
of migration to vary by group of children. (In Panel A, for example, we add an 
interaction term between migratory status and an indicator of whether a child is a girl, 
which would allow migration to affect boys and girls differently.) Each column in each 
panel shows the 2SLS estimates of a regression of a dependent variable listed in the top 
row on an independent variable listed in the left column and a set of control variables 
like those in the basic specifications. Columns 1-3 are for maternal migration; columns 
4-6 paternal migration. We do not present the effects of migration on education 
spending for brevity because all of the estimates are insignificant statistically. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
The main effects of maternal and paternal migration are similar to those in the basic 
results, both in terms of magnitude, sign, and statistical significance; they are also 
similar across the three specifications in Table 5. Maternal migration worsens children’s 
education; paternal migration improves it. Maternal migration lowers enrolment rates 
and the probability of receiving tuition by 15-16 and 14-16 percentage points, 
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respectively; paternal migration increases enrolment rates, class-age gaps, and the 
probability of receiving tuition by 10-11, 26-30, and 43-48 percentage points 
respectively. 
 
There is also some evidence that not only boys have better educational outcomes on 
average, they also gain more from migration (Panel A): Girls are a few percentage 
points less likely to enroll and receive tuition, though there seems to be no significant 
difference between boys and girls in terms of class-age gap (row 1). The effects of 
migration are also smaller for girls except the effects of paternal migration on enrolment 
status and the effects of maternal migration on class-age gap, though the latter is 
insignificant statistically (row 3). 
 
There is also some evidence that younger children have better enrolment rates and gain 
more from migration (Panel B). The estimate of the former (row 4) are significant 
statistically while those of the latter (row 6) are significant except for the effects of 
maternal migration on class-age gap and the probability of receiving tuition. 
 
Children of the more educated parents do better on average, but those of the less 
educated parents seem to gain more from migration (Panel C). The estimates in row 7 
are all negative and significant statistically; the estimates in row 9 are significant 
statistically except the effects of paternal migration on enrolment rates and class-age 
gap. 
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3.3 Discussions 
We discuss some mechanisms through which parental migration affects the migrants’ 
children’s education and why the effects of maternal and paternal migration differ.  
 
One, when women emigrate to work, their older children, especially girls, have to do 
household chores and take care of the younger siblings, which reduce the amount of 
time these older children spend to study and make them more likely to drop out of 
schools. Jayaweera et al. (2002), for example, find that migrant women’s children in Sri 
Lanka drop out of schools not only to do household work, but also to enter the labour 
market. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find similar results in Mexico: Parental 
migration lowers the enrolment rates of 16-18 years old girls and 12-18 years old boys. 
Our cohort analyses also support this mechanism. Estimates in Table 6 show the 
adverse effects of maternal migration on enrolment status are larger for girls and older 
children. Moreover, the age profile of female migrants from Sri Lanka fits this story: 
Our data show women on average emigrate when they are 37 years old and their eldest 
children are 12-13 years old.  
 
Two, women are perhaps thriftier: They finance the education of their children and shun 
sin goods such as cigarettes and alcoholic beverages more than men do. In her study on 
migrant households in a rural village in Sri Lanka, Gamburd (2004) finds some 
evidence that support this mechanism. Athuada and Fernando (2002) also find fathers in 
migrant households in Sri Lanka are more likely to smoke, drink alcohol, and use drugs 
compared to those in households in which the mothers work in the local labour market 
or stay at home. We do not find paternal migration increases the budget share of 
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education spending (Table 5), though this is partly because we exclude children who 
drop out of schools in the education spending regressions. But, we do find the budget 
share of alcoholic drinks and cigarettes in food spending increases by four and two 
percentage points, respectively, when women emigrate and the husbands stay at home 
in Sri Lanka; when men emigrate and the wives take care of the children, the budget 
share of cigarettes in food spending decreases by four or five percentage points.8  
 
Three, children perhaps miss their mothers more than they do their fathers so that 
maternal migration harm children psychologically more than paternal migration does. 
Save the Children (2006), for example, finds that, in two of the largest migrant source 
districts in Sri Lanka, about 20% of migrant women’s children have temper tantrums 
after their mothers left; 10% of the children below the age of 15 show signs of 
disobedience; and 4% of the migrant women’s school-age children (6-17 year olds) lack 
interests in school. While these are not necessarily the effects of maternal migration, 
they do suggest that maternal migration, because the absence of their mothers at home, 
worsens the educational outcomes of the migrant women’s children. 
 
Four, migrant women have lower paying jobs overseas and do not enjoy protection from 
abuse and exploitation. More than 90% of migrant women from Sri Lanka emigrate to 
the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries where reports of abuse, non-
payment of wages, and violations of labour and human rights are rampant (Gamburd, 
                                                          
8
 The estimates of the effects of paternal migration on the budget share of alcoholic drinks in 
food spending are negative, but they are insignificant statistically. All other estimates are 
significant at least at 5% level. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
18 
 
2000).9 They work as housemaids whose monthly salaries are between US$150-250 
(Kapur, 2013; Rasoolden, 2013). 
 
Five, migrant women are from poorer households whose infants are more likely to have 
low birth weight and to grow malnourished. Athauda and Fernando (2002), for example, 
find children whose mothers emigrate are 1.8 times more likely to fall ill compared to 
children whose mother stay at home or work in the local labour market. (However, the 
authors note that, because they are poorer, the former may have been unhealthier before 
their mothers migrate.) Moreover, because their lack of savings, these poor households 
are more likely to borrow from moneylenders at higher interest rates to finance their 
migration, which depletes their remitted incomes and reduce the money they can 
allocate for food and shelter, not to mention on the education of their children. 
 
 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Parental emigration from Sri Lanka does not seem to affect the education of the 
migrants’ children, but analyses by the migrants’ gender show maternal and paternal 
migration do matter and they have opposite effects. When mothers migrate and the 
fathers stay in the home country, the children’s education worsens; but when the fathers 
migrate and the mothers take care of the children, it improves. Maternal migration 
lowers the probability that children enroll in a school and they receive tuition by 22% 
and 50%, respectively; paternal migration raises them by 17% and 140%, respectively. 
                                                          
9
 We get the share of female emigration and abuse from the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign 
Employment’s Annual Statistics publications for the fifteen years from 1997-2011. 
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There is also some evidence that boys, younger children, and the children of the less 
educated parents gain more from their parents’ emigration. 
 
These results differ from Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and Mansuri (2006) who find 
migration improves children’s education and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010), Yang 
(2008), and others who show remittances improve children’s education. Our results also 
differ from Antman’s (2011) findings that Mexican children spend less time to study 
and more time to work when their fathers migrate to the US; in contrast, we find 
paternal migration improves children’s education. Moreover, we show that maternal 
migration—mothers from poor households work at low paying jobs overseas with 
minimal protection from abuse—worsens children’s education. 
 
Our results imply the government of Sri Lanka should keep persuading MENA 
countries to cover informal jobs such as housemaids under their labour laws, not only to 
protect the migrants, but also to improve the welfare of the migrants’ children. (The 
laws should protect housemaids from abuse and non-payment of wages; help should be 
also readily available when the housemaids need one.) Two, the government should also 
offer incentives for potential migrants to be trained as skilled workers such as cooks, 
babysitters, or caregiver, which offer better salaries and allow them to work in Asian 
countries where labour laws provide better protection. (A cooking or babysitting 
training is, of course, costly and poor households may not be able afford it, but moving 
to high-skilled jobs is perhaps the best long-term solution.) Three, the government 
should keep improving the domestic labour market. (If labour market in Sri Lanka 
grows fast, potential migrants do not have to take low-paying jobs overseas.)  
20 
 
 
One limitation of our paper is our instrumental variable does not differentiate maternal 
and paternal migration; we, therefore, cannot directly compare the effects of migration 
by gender. We also do not observe how well the children do in schools; such as, how 
high their marks are or whether they repeat grades (though we approximate the latter 
using the class-age gap). Moreover, we do not examine which of the mechanisms we 
suggest above are the most important mechanisms through which migration affects the 
migrants’ children’s education. . We can perhaps pursue these questions in future 
research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by type of household 
 
Migrants  
 
(1) 
Female 
migrants 
(2) 
Male 
migrants 
(3) 
Non-migrants 
 
(4) 
 
 
   
A. Educational outcomes and child characteristics 
School enrolment 0.84 
(0.36) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
Class-age gap -4.38 
(1.01) 
-4.42 
(1.07) 
-4.32 
(0.92) 
-4.43 
(1.01) 
Receive tuition 0.39 
(0.46) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.58 
(0.950) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Spending on education 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Age 12.73 
(3.85) 
13.00 
(3.87) 
12.35 
(3.82) 
12.66 
(4.01) 
Girl 0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
B. Parental- and household characteristics 
   
Mother’s age 37.20 
(7.15) 
36.42 
(7.32) 
38.61 
(6.61) 
39.29 
(7.35) 
Mother’s years of schooling 8.62 
(2.88) 
8.02 
(2.76) 
9.29 
(2.81) 
8.21 
(3.22) 
Father’s age 42.04 
(7.57) 
41.60 
(7.14) 
42.65 
(8.11) 
44.27 
(8.14) 
Father’s years of schooling 7.81 
(3.44) 
6.61 
(3.29) 
9.10 
(2.96) 
7.87 
(3.29) 
Number of children in household 1.89 
(1.29) 
2.00 
(1.42) 
1.74 
(1.11) 
1.52 
(1.42) 
Number of adults in household 2.27 
(2.44) 
2.32 
(2.59) 
2.20 
(2.22) 
2.11 
(2.40) 
Buddhist 0.52 
(0.34) 
0.65 
(0.36) 
0.32 
(0.32) 
0.60 
(0.36) 
Hindu 0.21 
(0.39) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.19 
(0.40) 
Muslim 0.17 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
Christian 0.10 
(0.30) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The numbers of observations for columns 1-4 are 406, 240, 166, 
and 7346 respectively. 
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Table 2. First-stage regression 
Dependent variable  
 
Parental migration  Maternal migration  Paternal migration 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 6) 
         
Agencies 0.15*** 0.15***  0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
 0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)   
Other controls         
Observations 7,752 7,752  7,586 7,586  7,512 7,512 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.28  0.22 0.28  0.25 0.29 
F-statistic 22.84 19.31  22.24 18.58  24.63 19.79 
Notes: The number in each cell is an estimate of the effect of agencies on a type of migration in the top rows: 
parental, maternal, or paternal migration. Agencies is an indicator equals one if a foreign-employment agency 
operated in the community and zero otherwise. Other control variables include sets of dummies for the age of the 
children, their gender; the age and educational attainment of their parents; their religion; the number of children in 
their households; and the number of adults in the household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the 
community level. All regressions include district fixed effects. The asterisks *** indicate statistical significance at 
0.1% level. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by type of community 
 Agencies=1 
(1) 
Agencies=0 
(2)  
 
   
A. Access to facilities and migration in the past 
Community are better off compared to ten years 
ago  
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.86 
(0.35)  
Years of operation of oldest school in 
community 
51.60 
(40.57) 
49.26 
(35.14)  
Years of operation of oldest health facility in 
community 
30.85 
(26.85) 
30.74 
(26.85)  
Migrated internally since 1995 0.02 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.13)  
B. Current access to facilities 
   
Primary schools 0.58 
(0.49) 
0.54 
(0.50)  
Secondary schools 0.44 
(0.50) 
0.40 
(0.49)  
Health centres 0.42 
(0.49) 
0.43 
(0.50)  
Public health care facilities 0.15 
(0.36) 
0.20 
(0.40)  
Private health care facilities 0.32 
(0.47) 
0.33 
(0.47)  
Main roads 0.68 
(0.47) 
0.68 
(0.47)  
Post offices 0.38 
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.50)  
Banks 0.25 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.45)  
Markets 0.20 
(0.40) 
0.23 
(0.43)  
Bus stops 0.29 
(0.45) 
0.31 
(0.49)  
Local administrative offices 0.93 
(0.26) 
0.94 
(0.24)  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The numbers of observations for columns 1-2 are 
2,279 and 5,473, respectively. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by type of community (continued) 
 
Agencies=1 
(1) 
Agencies=0 
(2)  
    
C. Parent- and household characteristics 
Father’s age 
43.50 
(7.87) 
44.20 
(8.15)  
Mother’s age 
39.02 
(7.17) 
39.18 
(7.37)  
Father’s years of schooling 
7.94 
(3.30) 
7.76 
(3.27)  
Mother’s years of schooling 
8.29 
(3.21) 
8.15 
(3.19)  
Total Number of Children in Household 
1.83 
(1.06) 
1.78 
(1.04)  
Total Number of Adults in Household 
2.17 
(2.19) 
2.28 
(2.22)  
Buddhist 
0.61 
(0.33) 
0.64 
(0.34)  
Hindu 
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.18 
(0.42)  
Muslim 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.10 
(0.37)  
Christian 
0.10 
(0.25) 
0.11 
(0.27)  
D. Child characteristics and educational outcomes   
School enrolment 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.85 
(0.36)  
Class-age gap 
4.39 
(1.29) 
4.30 
(1.18)  
Receive tuition 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.41 
(0.56)  
Spending on education 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.09)  
Age 
12.34 
(3.91) 
12.15 
(3.91)  
Girl 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50)  
    
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The numbers of observations for columns 1-2 are 
2,279 and 5,473, respectively.  
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Table 4. The effects of parental migration on school enrolment 
 
 OLS 2SLS 
 
 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  
Parental migration (1) -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Maternal migration  (2) -0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
Paternal migration (3) 0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.15** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
Other controls  
     
Notes: The number in each cell is an estimate of the effects of a type of migration listed on the left column on school 
enrolment. Parental, maternal, and paternal migration are indicators equal one if the parent, mother or father of a 
child is a migrant and zero otherwise. Other control variables include sets of dummies for the age of the children, 
their gender; the age and educational attainment of their parents; their religion; the number of children in their 
households; and number of adults in the household. The numbers of observations for rows 1-3 are 7,752, 7,586, and 
7,512, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the community level. All regressions 
include district fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
31 
 
Table 5. The effects of parental migration on other educational outcomes 
  OLS 2SLS 
  
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  
A.  Parental migration  
  
 
   
Class-age gap (1) 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
 
0.01 
(0.1) 
0.01 
(0.1) 
Receive tuition (2) 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
 
0.14 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.07) 
Spending on education  (3) 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
B.  Maternal migration         
Class-age gap (4) -0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
 
-0.27 
(0.15) 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
Receive tuition (5) -0.09* 
(0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
Spending on education (6) -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
C.  Paternal migration        
Class-age gap (7) 0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
 
0.37** 
(0.14) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
Receive tuition (8) 0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.15** 
(0.05) 
 
0.51*** 
(0.07) 
0.49*** 
(0.08) 
Spending on education (9) 0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Other controls  
     
Notes: The number in each cell is an estimate of the effects of a type of migration listed as panel headings on an 
educational outcome: class-age gap, receive tuition and spending on education. Parental, maternal, and paternal 
migration are indicators equal one if the parent, mother or father of a child is a migrant and zero otherwise. Other 
control variables include sets of dummies for the age of the children, their gender; the age and educational attainment 
of their parents; their religion; the number of children in their households; and number of adults in the household. The 
numbers of observations for rows 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 are 6,512, 6,374, and 6,085, respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses clustered at the community level. All regressions include district fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Cohort analysis 
  
Maternal migration Paternal migration 
Dependent variable  School 
enrolment 
Class-age  
gap 
Receive 
tuition 
School 
enrolment 
Class-age  
gap 
Receive 
tuition 
  
 (1) (2)  (3)   (4) (5)  (6)  
A.  Gender of child  
   
   
Girl (1) -0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Migration (2) -0.15** 
(0.05) 
-0.24 
(0.16) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.30* 
(0.14) 
0.48*** 
(0.09) 
Girl*Migration (3) -0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.1) 
-0.09** 
(0.03) 
B.  Age of child  
   
   
Older child (4) -0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Migration (5) -0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.22 
(0.18) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.29* 
(0.14) 
0.43*** 
(0.08) 
Older child*Migration (6) -0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
C. Parent’s education  
      
Less educated parent (7) -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
Migration (8) -0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.23 
(0.18) 
-0.15* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.26* 
(0.13) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
Less educated 
parent*Migration 
(9) -0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Notes: The number in each cell is an estimate of the effects of a type of migration, maternal or paternal migration, on an 
educational outcome. Maternal and paternal migration are indicators equal one if the mother or father of a child is a 
migrant and zero otherwise. We define older child equals one if a child is 15-18 years old and less educated parent equals 
one if the parents have eight years of schooling or less. Other control variables include sets of dummies for the age of the 
children (except for panel B regressions), their gender (except for panel A regressions); the age and educational attainment 
of their parents (except for panel C regressions); their religion; the number of children in their households; and the number 
of adults in the household. The number of observations for column one is 7,586, columns two and three 6,374, column four 
7,512, and columns five and six 6,085. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the community level. All 
regressions include district fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
